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The end of the first decade of the new millennium was marred by a sudden and
precipitous economic collapse, the likes of which had not been seen in nearly a century.
This was not a localized affair but a globally-linked recession that touched nearly every
nation in the developed world. The Eurozone, which had only just made its first tenuous
steps towards monetary union, was among the hardest hit by the disaster. The focus of
the Eurozone’s distress were the “PIIGS” states—Portugal, Italy, Ireland, Greece, and
Spain. In response to a combination of poor capital controls and irresponsible investing,
the European Central Bank (ECB) and the International Monetary Fund (IMF) were
forced to hand down billions of euros in the form of numerous bailouts to help stabilize
these states’ financial institutions. The PIIGS states, however, were not the only
Eurozone members to suffer from the financial collapse: Cyprus, who joined the
European Union in 2004 and the Eurozone in 2008, experienced similar fiscal turmoil.
The ECB, however, did not respond to Cyprus with the same set of financial and
monetary restructural requirements it did in response to the rest of its irresponsible
children. It punished the island nation for its close ties with Russia by instituting an
unprecedented bail-in policy that to this day risks the economic stability of Europe.
While this study gives a brief analysis of the factors that led to the financial collapse
within several of the PIIGS states1 and the ECB’s response to each case, my main
purpose is to demonstrate how the ECB’s disproportionate punishment of Cyprus has

1

Since Italy has yet to receive a bailout from the ECB, it will not be examined in this paper.
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risked leading the Eurozone down a dangerous financial path from which it may not be
able to recover.

Background
Although the global housing bubble had already peaked by 2006, the current
global financial crisis began in earnest in early fall 2008 with the collapse of key financial
institutions such as Lehman Brothers and Bear Stearns, due to the effects of drastic
overleveraging of capital in risky subprime mortgage loans. These rapid failures spread
like a contagion throughout international financial markets. Although far from being the
first financial crisis of its kind in recent memory—Reinhart and Rogoff identify 18
separate financial crises since the Second World War with similar financial
circumstances2—it has resulted in the deepest global recession since the Great
Depression.3
The PIIGS states faced a problem heretofore unseen in modern finance: since
they had all become members of Eurozone, they had ceded sovereign control of their
own fiscal policies to the European Union, making them less able to respond to shifts
within their respective economies. Notably, they lack the ability to devalue their own
currency, thus losing one of the most potent tools of a state to directly affect interest,

2

(Reinhart and Rogoff 2008)

3

(Davis 2008)
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and by extension investment, rates.4 This lack of fiscal self-determination makes them
an interesting area of study, particularly in light of the changes brought to the European
Stability Mechanism (ESM) caused by “the Cypriot problem”. Because of Cyprus’s
failures and fiscal mismanagements, and perhaps due to its close relationship with
Russia, the depositors of Cyprus’s primary banks were forced by the ECB to take
significant “haircuts,” that is, losing nearly 10% of their deposited Euros. This was the
price Cyprus paid in order to receive a loan to recapitalize their financial institutions—in
stark contrast to the taxpayer-funded bailouts received by the rest of the PIIGS states.
This change in fiscal response mechanism is one that risks the very foundation of the
Eurozone by further reducing faith of potential investors in Eurozone markets.

Spain
In order to understand the raw deal given to Cyprus, we must first look to the
other primary recipients of aid from the ECB. Upon reflection, the difficult measures
enforced in these countries will seem even-handed when compared to the treatment
that Cyprus received. As Spain is the fourth largest economy in the Eurozone, the
prospect of a Spanish economic failure would pose catastrophic consequences to not
only the Euro, but to the survival of the European Union itself.5 Spain’s sudden state of
affairs came as something of a shock in the grand scheme of the Eurozone crisis. For the

4

(The PIIGS that won't fly 2010)

5

(The Euro Crisis: How to save Spain 2012)

Hess 5
better part of the first decade of the 21st century, the country seemed to be handling its
finances responsibly, ensuring that its debt to GDP ratio remained at acceptable levels.
Between 2007 and 2009 however, the Spanish deficit rose to over 11% its GDP while its
total national debt was resting at 70% of GDP.6 According to the International Monetary
Fund (IMF), Spain’s woes were caused at least in part by a permanent loss of revenue
due to the international financial crisis: “The persistence of deficits reflects permanent
revenue losses, primarily from a steep decline in potential GDP during the crisis, but also
due to the impact of lower asset prices and financial sector profits”.7 The problems did
not start with just these economic indicators, however. Like the other states most
affected by the financial crisis, excessive optimism in the housing market, combined
with subprime mortgage lending, caused strain on Spain’s financial institutions.8
In June of 2012, Spain formally requested the aid from the European Union to
recapitalize its ailing financial sector, receiving over €100 billion from the ECB.9 In
exchange, Spain was required to undergo austerity measures including cutting the
deficit by €65 billion over three years10 in order to bring its financial sector back under
control.11 In January of 2014, Spain successfully completed the structural readjustment

6

(Debt Crisis: The Spanish Problem 2010)

7

(FIscal Affairs Department of the International Monetary Fund 2010)

8

(Frayer 2014)

9

(On being propped up 2013)

10

(Roman and Winning 2012)

11

(Geitner, Kulish and Minder 2012)
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requirements imposed by the ECB, including the merger of 38 financial institutions and
major reforms to the house lending market12—although unemployment rates remain at
nearly one quarter of the labor force.13 While still not back to pre-crash levels, Spain is
well on its way to recovery through the program set out by the ECB.

Ireland
Prior to 2002, Ireland had what seemed to be one of the relatively healthiest
economies within the Eurozone, with nearly full employment levels at a 4% nominal
unemployment rate.14 Like the United States, however, it focused entirely too much on
the housing sector and its related industries. While the Irish financial sector appeared as
profitable as ever, its true status was masked by an over-reliance on speculative
investments and aggressive construction. The government was likewise overly trusting
of what we now know to be a bubble in housing prices, with more than 16% of the tax
base of the country stemming directly from stamp duties, Value-Added Taxes (VAT), and
capital gains taxes based on land.15 When the bubble burst, not only were the banks
hamstrung, but the government found itself bereft of a great percentage of expected
revenues deriving from the aforementioned taxes.

12

(On being propped up 2013)

13

(Román 2015)

14

(The European Commission 2012)

15

Ibid.
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When the housing market crashed in 2008, the Irish government decided to
cover the full cost of the debts of the affected banks as well as that of recapitalizing
them; along with the tax shortfall experienced as a result of the same crash, these
measures caused the government to be unable to effectively service their foreign debt
stocks, shutting them out of the international debt market. In November of 2010,
Ireland was forced to receive an €85 billion bailout and imposed structural readjustment
or risk intentional neglect from the ECB. The specifics of these reforms are beyond the
scope of this paper, but include elements such as mergers of financial institutions,
lowering of the minimum wage, steep cut backs to government programs, and harsh
restrictions on how and to whom banks can lend money.1617
Although one of the countries hardest hit by the recession, Ireland is now on the
path to recovery since its exit from its bailout program in late 2013.18 Recapitalization of
the banks has been successfully concluded, the nation has been meeting every
benchmark for reducing the budget deficit to acceptable levels, and efforts are
underway to reform the labor market across the board after the collapse of the
regulatory, financial, and housing markets.19

16

(German Federal Ministry of Finance 2013)

17

(Castle 2015)

18

(Ireland's bail-out exit 2013)

19

Ibid.

Hess 8

Portugal
Unlike Ireland, at the onset of the economic crisis Portugal was in the midst of
political as well as economic turmoil.20 In 2009, Prime Minister José Sócrates's
controlling grasp of the Assembly of the Republic was loosened when his socialist party
lost ground to smaller fringe parties on both the left and the right. Although still
maintaining a plurality of the assembly, the socialists seemed to be headed into a forced
coalition with radical fringe parties. This outcome would have threatened their political
existence from the ensuing backlash: allying with left-fringe parties like the Left Block
could have induced far more radical reforms than Sócrates's socialist party would
allow—including sweeping rounds of nationalization and a withdraw from NATO—
making an alliance with the conservative People's Party more likely (though still
unpalatable) in order to retain the support of business owners.21 This coalition did not
come to pass however, leading to an impasse in the assembly that prevented it from
passing a budget until well into late 2010. Portugal’s political troubles continued on.
Sócrates was forced to resign in 2011 following continued poor economic performance
that made the state the third in the Eurozone to request aid from The European
Commission, the European Central Bank, and the International Monetary Fund—
collectively known as the “Troika”.22

20

(Erlanger and Minder 2010)

21

(Socratic method 2009)

22

(Lewis, Macdonald and Kowsmann 2011)
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Portugal’s troubles began long before the rest of the other PIIGS states—
reaching as far back as the turn of the millennium and the creation of the Eurozone
itself. For the past decade, Portugal had been in an economic slump: Its real GDP per
capita raised less than half the rate of the Euro area average and almost two thirds less
than their trading partners in the Eurozone from 2000-2007, making it the poorest state
in the Eurozone.23 Unemployment markers were likewise abysmal, doubling within the
same time span as there was were marked increases in employment in Spain and
France.24 During this period Portugal’s economy shifted towards services and other nontradable sectors, drastically affecting its current account balance by winnowing out
Portuguese exports and making them more dependent on imports. Within a single
decade, Portugal’s foreign-owned debt skyrocketed to € 165 billion—more than its
entire GDP. When it became clear that Portugal would be unable to service its debt, it
was forced to seek relief from the IMF and the Troika.
On April 6th of 2011, caretaker Prime Minister Sócrates officially announced that
his government would be seeking a bailout of €78 billion in order to help get a handle
on its current account balance issues, as well as its 9.1% deficit. The deal, which was to
be executed over the course of three years, would carry an interest rate less than half
the going market rate for a similar long-term loan. In return, Portugal was tasked with
reaching certain benchmarks regarding its budget deficit each year: 5.9% of GDP by the

23

(Reis 2013)

24

Ibid.
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end of 2011, 4.5% by the end of 2012, and 3% by the end of 2013. In addition, Portugal
was asked to find at least €5.5 billion by selling off government assets and drastically
cutting government expenditures.25 The government attempted to accomplish this
through a series of increasingly difficult austerity budgets that have created deep
political and social unrest within the state. 26 27 28 Following the budget posted in
October of 2014, thousands of protesters clogged the streets of Lisbon and Porto in
order to express their frustration with increased austerity measures that further
reduced wages and social services in the midst of rampant unemployment and
economic recession.29
On May 17th 2014, Portugal officially exited its three-year bailout program,
although its recovery had not been nearly as successful as had been hoped for during
initial deliberations.30 Sovereign debt remains nearly a third higher than the state’s GDP,
output has fallen nearly six percent, and unemployment had reached a staggering
17.6%31—a number that would surely have been higher were it not for the brain drain

25

(Kowsmann, Portugal Bailout Plan Detailed 2011)

26

(Wise, Portugal Announces More Austerity Measures 2011)

27

(Kowsmann, Portugal Unveils Toughest Austerity Budget Yet 2013)

28

(Austerity in Portugal 2012)

29

(Al Jazeera and agencies 2013)

30

(Wise, Portugal exits bailout without safety net of credit line 2014)

31

(Portugal’s bail-out: Final Call 2014)
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caused by the educated youth leaving the state for better prospects abroad. 32 Not
everything was bleak, however: the trade imbalance that was a major source of
Portugal’s economic slump leading into the financial crisis had turned around into a net
positive. Although the bailout was not nearly as successful as the Portuguese and the
rest of the Eurozone had hoped it would be, this is only the first step in the process to
recovery.

Greece
When speaking of the Eurozone crisis, it is difficult to overstate the impact that
Greece’s banking and governmental disingenuity had on not only its own economy, but
also on those of the other PIIGS states. The public sector was the greatest contributor to
the crisis by far: in the first half of the 2000s, government wages rose by more than 50%
while at the same time the government was taking on tremendous debts in order to
finance the Athens Olympics.33 In addition to this, in October of 2009 it became clear
that Greece had been intentionally misleading the European community as to the state
of its current account: its deficit exceeded 13% of GDP—dramatically more than the 3%
target for Eurozone members—and its sovereign debt topped 115% of the state’s GDP.34

32

(Wise, The educated unemployed bid farewell to Portugal and austerity 2013)

33

(Eurozone crisis explained 2012)

34

(Europe's sovereign-debt crisis: Acropolis Now 2010)
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By August of 2011, the S&P had downgraded Greece’s credit rating from A to CC.
Greece was described by the ratings organization as “Currently vulnerable and
dependent on favorable business, financial and economic conditions to meet financial
commitments,”35 indicating a significant probability of default.
Upon Greece’s first major credit downgrading in 2010, Eurozone members gave
Greece its first major bailout of €110 billion36 (€80 billion from the Eurozone and €30
billion from the IMF)37, with the expectation that steep austerity measures would
follow. By requiring such steep measures, the Troika sent a message to other Eurozone
members to avoid the failures of Greece, an intent that was directly echoed by the
German Chancellor:
Noting that Greece is going to have to make deep and painful cuts to public
sector pay and benefits while raising taxes sharply, Mrs. Merkel said those harsh
terms would deter other Eurozone countries from getting into similar pickles.
Other heavily indebted governments would ‘see that Greece's path, with the
IMF's strict terms, is not easy, so they will do everything to avoid that for
themselves,’ Mrs. Merkel said.38

35

(Standard and Poor's Rating Service 2015)

36

(Magnay, et al. 2010)

37

(Europe agrees a "shock and awe" bail-out for Greece 2010)

38

Ibid.
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Over the next several years, Greece passed a series of austerity budgets that
were met with everything from outrage to riots to suicidal protests.39 40 In 2012, the
Troika felt that a second “economic adjustment program” was needed in Greece, giving
the state an additional €130 billion.41 The austerity requirements that came as the price
for this loan caused some to call the situation experienced by the Greek people a
“humanitarian crisis” due to the personal sacrifices imposed by the state.42 In early
2015, the terms of this agreement was revised in order to bring some relief to Greece,
but recovery is still a long way off.43 Despite this unusual series of bailouts, perhaps the
most controversial move by the ECB was the 2011 decision to entirely write off half of
all of Greece’s foreign-owned debt, directly causing the spread of the financial crisis to
Cyprus—one of the primary holders of Greek debt and our primary subject for the
remainder of this study.44

The Cypriot Case

39

(Weeks and Bensasson 2010)

40

(Kitsantonis and Donadio, Greek Parliament Passes Austerity Plan After Riots Rage 2012)

41

(The European Commission 2015)

42

(Kanter and Kitsantonis 2015)

43

Ibid.

44

(Higgins and Alderman, Europeans planted seeds of crisis in Cyprus 2013)
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As part of its EU accession and adoption of the Euro, Cyprus was forced to meet
financial convergence criteria that included that rapid liberalization of its fiscal policy
and financial industries.45 Perhaps due in part to this sudden expansion of the financial
sector, within three years of adopting the Euro the top Cypriot banks soon found
themselves in possession of assets over 8 times the GDP of the small island nation.46
Prior to their accession, Cyprus had maintained a cozy relationship with Russian
financiers, who made judicious use of the state in Cayman island-like tax evasion and
money laundering ventures.47 This only increased with further liberalization, making the
lion’s share of the banks’ assets international depositors. In addition to these factors,
Cyprus’s historical and economic ties to Greece led them to take on major shares of
Greek bonds. When the financial crisis tanked Greece’s economy, borrowing costs in
Cyprus skyrocketed; When Greek foreign debt was partially forgiven, the Cypriot
economy crumbled.48
In 2011, the Cypriot national deficit rose to 7.4% GDP, more than twice the
acceptable amount provided for by the regulations of the European Union. 49 As a direct
result, the ECB imposed sudden capital control and closed the two largest banks of
Cyprus for two weeks. These actions caused domestic economic output to fall by over

45

(Georgiou 2013)

46

(Milne 2013)

47

(Eurozone confident on Cyprus bailout 2013)

48

(Georgiou 2013)

49

Ibid.
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5%,50 forcing the Cypriot parliament to approach the ECB for more substantive action
towards financial stabilization51. On March 25 2013, Cyprus and the ECB agreed upon an
initial €10 billion bailout package that differed significantly from those received by the
PIIGS states. The agreement placed the onus of recapitalization on the depositors of the
Cypriot banks—as opposed to the taxpayers, who would have provided for it through a
general fund. Though initially categorically rejected by newly-elected Cypriot President
Anastasiades,52 Cyprus was eventually forced to come to terms with the reality that
depositors were going to have to take a 10% “haircut” on their accounts over €100,000,
unprecedented in modern finance.53 Indeed, the deal is better described as a “bail-in” in
order to reflect the responsibility that is being placed upon individual depositors as
opposed to the taxpayers at large.
Why, when under similar financial duress, was Cyprus treated so differently than
the PIIGS states? This monumental agreement was reached in light of years of fiscal
mismanagement of the Cypriot banks, both at the private and national levels. When
financial indicators began to sour in 2011, the European Banking Authority (EBA)—the
regulatory arm of the EU’s financial sector—informed the Cypriot government that their
national banks should begin to create a “buffer” of around 9% of their tier 1 capital ratio

50

(Cyprus one year on: Injured Island 2014)

51

(Zenios 2014)

52

(Eurozone confident on Cyprus bailout 2013)

53

(Barker 2013)
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(the ratio of a banks’ equity capital and it’s risk-weighted assets54) by July 2012. The
ECB’s forgiving of Greek foreign-owned debt would make this goal an impossibility:
none of the previously-successful banks came close to reaching this goal, some missing
it by nearly one quarter of a billion dollars.55 Had they managed to successfully create
this buffer, the impact on depositors would have been significantly lessened.
In addition to their financial mismanagements, the primary Cypriot banks held a
reputation as dealing in seedier and far more salacious business that may have led to
their disproportionate punishment by the rest of the European community: they had
the appearance of having a money-laundering relationship with Russian arms-dealers in
Syria.56 Even though the illegal nature of their dealing with Russia is questionable,57
their cozy financial relationship with the country did nothing to help the new member’s
standing.58 In the end, the most likely reason for the ECB’s punishment of Cyprus is that
the majority of these financial mishandlings were conducted prior to their induction to
the Eurozone in 2008 – in effect bringing billions of euros of toxic assets into the
Eurozone at a critically bad moment.

54

(Investopedia 2015)

55

(Zenios 2014)

56

(Matthews 2013)

57

Although, it appears circumstantially damning. Even the business arm of Russia Today is unable

to deny the strong and questionable financial connection between the two states. See (RT
Business 2013).
58

(Higgins, Cyprus Bank's Bailout Hands Ownership to Russian Plutocrats 2013)
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The Bail-In
The bail-in is a revolutionary economic tool that I believe will negatively affect
the future economic stability of the Eurozone states. The bail-in itself consists of two
primary actions: it divides insured domestic accounts from the affected national banks
containing under €100,000 into newly-created financial institutions, and it forces the
remaining accounts with over €100,000 to take a scaling 6.75-9.9% haircut to pay down
the debt.59 This deal so revolutionized Eurozone economics that the directive
empowering the ECB to take this action was passed almost exactly a year after talks
with Cyprus were concluded.60 Prior to the Cypriot case, the Troika did not have the
power to allocate and divide the assets of financial institutions directly in this manner.
This has the particularly troublesome effect that certain exclusions and protections
given to future cases were not applied to the Cypriot crisis (e.g. accrued pension funds
and other benefits).61
ECB president Mario Draghi, with the support of Germany and other important
players in the Eurozone, has lauded the bail-in response as the future model for the EU
in dealing with financial crises.62 Although the policy will officially go into effect in 2018,

59

(Birnbaum and Schneider 2013)

60

(The European Parliament and the Council of the European Union 2014)

61

(Zenios 2014)

62

(Steen 2013)
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Draghi has been pushing for region-wide adoption as soon as 2015.63 However, this pancontinental application of bail-in policy is among the most real threats to the stability of
the Eurozone. As it stands, the European Union is a collective of loosely aligned states
within a geographic region that share several broad values—democratic representation,
capitalism, etc.—but differ on many of the nuances. Among the 28 member states of
the EU, nearly one third elected not to enter the Eurozone—most notably, perhaps, the
United Kingdom. Since lessened sovereignty in the form of delegated monetary policy
came part and parcel with the adoption of the Euro, many nations elected not to join.
Even though the Eurozone ceded control of their monetary policy to the Troika, the
member nations retain control over their fiscal policy—the separation of which can be
particularly detrimental to the application of structural debt management solutions.64 If
you add investor, and even depositor, uncertainty to every fluctuation in the market,
capital flight and runs on the bank will become crippling and increasingly frequent
concerns.
The bail-in has not saved Cyprus. After nearly three years, unemployment
remains at record highs, domestic income is swiftly eroding, and over half of all loans in
the country are in a state of default.65 The Eurozone, while recovering, is doing so at an

63

Ibid.

64

(Togo 2007)

65

(Guzzo 2014)
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all-too-slow pace. In an Op-ed piece for the New York Times, Paul Krugman looks at the
relative recoveries of the United States and the Eurozone:
America has yet to achieve a full recovery from the effects of the 2008 financial crisis.
Still, it seems fair to say that we’ve made up much, though by no means all, of the lost
ground. But you can’t say the same about the eurozone, where real G.D.P. per capita is
still lower than it was in 2007, and 10 percent or more below where it was supposed to
be by now. This is worse than Europe’s track record during the 1930s. 66

It is clear that recovery is taking too long, a problem that the bail-in would not seem to
remedy if the Cypriot experience is taken as an auger.

Options: Iceland’s Example and the state of the Eurozone
Where, then, can we look to find a stronger solution to difficulties such as the
one experienced in Cyprus? In Iceland, an island that was among the worst and first hit
by the 2008 financial crisis, under circumstances shockingly similar to those of Cyprus.
“No other developed country endured a systemic collapse in its banking sector on the
scale that occurred in Iceland or, indeed, rarely in the history of finance” said
Sigurjonsson and Mixa in their 2011 report “Learning from the ‘Worst Behaved.’” When
Iceland’s three main banks, Glitnir, Landsbanki, and Kaupthing, became insolvent, they
held assets worth over 10 times the GDP of the small island nation.67 It seems evident
that Iceland’s insolvency stems from four primary sources: rapid privatization of the

66

(Krugman, That Old-Time Economics 2015)

67

(Milne 2013)
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state’s financial institutions from 1992-2003 (although general liberalization of foreign
exchange and fiscal policy began at a much earlier date), inexperience and
incompetence of banking executives caused by nepotism, financial compensation
models that encouraged risky investments, and the overleveraging of investments
abroad in the form of loans, primarily to England and Scotland.68
Here is where Iceland’s response diverges from Cyprus: to combat the freefall of
their financial sector, the Icelandic government—in direct opposition to the dominant
austerity policies of other nations— seized direct control of their banks, separated
domestic and foreign depositors, and used a $5 billion loan from the IMF and other
Nordic states to deal with their shortfall and begin direct reinvestment back into the
market.69 The results have been astounding:
Few countries blew up more spectacularly than Iceland in the 2008 financial crisis […].
Since then, Iceland has turned in a pretty impressive performance. It has repaid
International Monetary Fund rescue loans ahead of schedule. Growth this year [2012]
will be about 2.5 percent, better than most developed economies. Unemployment has
fallen by half. In February, Fitch Ratings restored the country’s investment-grade status,
approvingly citing its “unorthodox crisis policy response.” 70

The parallels between Iceland and Cyprus here are stunning: two island nations,
both vying for inclusion in the EU, allowed their primary financial institutions to amass

68

(Sigurjonsson and Mixa 2011)

69

(Hart-Landsberg 2013)

70

(The Editors of Bloomberg 2012)
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tremendous amounts of capital—several times in excess of their country’s GDP—in the
form of questionable foreign investment and debt acquisition, causing their catastrophic
economic collapses. Even their financial responses were similar: in both cases, the
depositors of the financial institutions were shuffled around into new banks, leaving one
set of depositors to bear the brunt of recapitalization. Where Iceland and Cyprus have
primarily differed comes as a result their relationships with the EU. Whereas Iceland has
recently halted its once-promising EU accession talks,71 by the start of the financial
collapse Cyprus had already been accepted as a member of both the EU and Eurozone
itself.72 Since Cyprus relies on the EU and the European Central Bank (ECB) for monetary
policy, the country was unable to take the unilateral—and controversial—actions that
benefited Iceland so well. Where Iceland protected its national depositors by directly
transferring their assets to new banks—Arion Bank for Kaupthing, Landsbankinn for
Landsbanki, and Islandsbanki for Glitnir—leaving foreign depositors and creditors to
take the brunt of their recapitalization efforts,73 Cyprus was forced by the ECB to adopt
a more radical “bail-in” policy.74
Would Iceland’s example work for the Eurozone? Perhaps in some cases, but it
would not solve the structural deficiencies shown by the ECB’s response to the
economic crisis. Monetary policy cannot be used as a blunt weapon, ignoring the
71

(The Associated Press 2013)

72

(Georgiou 2013)

73

(Milne 2013)

74

(Jenkins, Jr. 2013)
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specific qualities of each state’s circumstance in its implementation, nor can it be fully
divested from fiscal policy. In light of this, there are two potential paths that the
Eurozone can pursue in the future: the current path, where nations are bound by the
ECB’s monetary policy; or, the path of political union. Neither option is perfect. The
current path allows for the maintenance of the status quo, where the Eurozone member
states can claim to their people to remain sovereign entities—while in fact being
hamstrung in their ability to react fully to financial mishaps through the coordination of
all available political tools. The path of political union is by far the more radical, due to
its total subsuming of national sovereignty to the EU, but may be the most lasting
option for the success of the Euro that can be offered. By unifying fiscal and monetary
policy, thereby tearing down the last of the borders that separate the states of the
Eurozone, it can be possible to make targeted changes to the financial landscape to
provide for the best possible outcomes.
The Eurozone is unlikely to collapse anytime soon—the costs, both political and
economic, associated with such a move are impossible to fully calculate—but that does
not mean that the system is living up to its true potential. Cyprus is merely a symptom
of greater unease within the union. Unless these various nations, divided by millennia of
cultural differences and united only by shared geographic and economic goals, are able
to come together and work as one body—with each nation being treated fairly and as
equal partners—then the monetary union they have created will fail, even as it limps
through the coming years.
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